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Class Suits Under the Codes
Joseph J. Simeone, Jr.
INTRODUCMION
IN A VARIETY of legal problems today the individual finds himself
a part of a group who have similar yet separate interests. The legal
claims of the various members of the group arise from the same or a
similar fact pattern. The employee who like other employees has a claim
for compensation against their common employer, the defrauded investor
who with other victims demands compensation, the consumer of power
who with others is entitled to judicial relief against a public utility sug-
gest the variety of group problems confronting modem courts. In such
situations it may be asked
to what extent do the
TiHi AUTHOR (LL.B., 1946, Washington Uni- courts recognize the mdi-
versity; B.S., 1953, St. Louis University; LL.M., vidual's rights when he is
1954, University of Michigan) is Associate
Professor of Law at St. Louis University. bound to a group who are
in a similar situation, and
to what extent do the
courts provide all the individual members of the group with a speedy
device for the disposition of their claims. Have remedial devices been
established which will recognize the interests of each member of the
ascertained group in order that he may seek and obtain full relief?
The procedural reforms of Anglo-American law which commenced in
England with the Judicature Acts of 18751 and culminated in America
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 have introduced into the judi-
cial process many new procedural devices which permit effective and com-
prehensive settlement of controversies. The modern interpleader statutes,
the third party procedure, the modern rules governing parties, the exten-
sive counterclaim provisions are but a few of the modern devices. The
class suit doctrine is also a traditional device to dispose of multi-party
situations. It is this doctrine that is the subject of special study here.
What are its historical bases, its essentAal ingredients, its limits and de-
fects, its ability or inability to dispose of multiple claims? How effective
is this traditional remedy in modern society? Is there a need for a new
remedy more effective to dispose of the interests of the individual when
he is a member of a group having the same or similar interests? Has
138 & 39 Vict., c. 77.
'And of course the rules adopted in the various states which substantially duplicate
the Federal Rules. See list of States, note 31, infra.
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this doctrine met the test of all procedure -to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of substantive rights?
This article proposes to discuss: 1) the extent to which the class suit
has been authorized and permitted under code provisions, 2) the limita-
tions of the class suit when separate and distinct rights of individual
members of a group arise from the same or similar transactions or occur-
rences and 3) the logical and legal bases for any such limitations.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The fundamental philosophy underlying English equitable procedure
with reference to parties was, simply, to do complete justice. As distin-
guished from the strictness of the common law, the motive of equity was
to grant full relief to all concerned, to those who were interested in the
subject of the action or in the object of the suit and, to that end, the pri-
mary object was to have all persons who were sufficiently interested be-
fore the court so that relief might be properly adjusted among the parties.3
English equity, therefore, laid down the fundamental rule that all persons
who were materially interested in the subject of the suit ought to be
parties thereto, however numerous they may be, so that a complete decree
might be made.4 "All parties having an apparent right must be brought
into Court before the Court will do anything, which may affect their
right," said the Lord Chancellor in an early case.5
Many cases arose, however, where a strict adherence to these funda-
mental rules would violate complete justice. Where the parties interested
in the subject or object of the suit were so numerous that justice would
not be served, as in the case of continued abatements caused by the multi-
'POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 152 (5th ed. 1941). Pomeroy, in his
treatise states the above in this manner: "The equitable doctrines with respect to
parties and judgment are wholly unlike those which prevailed at the common law,
different in their fundamental conceptions, in their practical operation, in their
adaptability to circumstances, and in their results upon the rights and duties of liti-
gants.... Its fundamental principle concerning parties is, that all persons in whose
favor or against whom there might be a recovery, however partial, and also all per-
sons who are so interested, although indirectly, in the subject-matter and the relief
granted, that their rights or duties might be affected by the decree, although no
substantial recovery can be obtained either for or against them, shall be made parties
to the suit .... The primary object is, that all persons sufficiently interested may be
before the court, so that the relief may be properly adjusted among those entitled,
the liabilities properly apportioned, and the incidental or consequential claims or
interests of all may be fixed, and all may be bound in respect thereto by the single
decree."
IREDESDALE, CHANCERY PLEADINGS, 144 (2d ed. 1789); Poore v. Clarke, 2 Atk.
515, 26 Eng. Rep. 710 (1742) indicated that "if you draw the jurisdiction out of a
court of law you must have all persons parties before this court, who will be neces-
sary to make the determination complete, and to quiet the question."
'Anon., 1 Ves. Jr. 29, 30 Eng. Rep. 215 (1789).
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tude of parties involved, equity procedure was quick to develop the class
device. The class suit was therefore a development of equitable proce-
dure and was designed by the chancellors to fill a need, based upon con-
venience, to dispose of multiple party litigation. It was felt by the chan-
cellors that if there were too many persons involved in a particular liti-
gation it was not necessary to have them all present, if there were such a
number that could stand in the shoes of those who were absent and could
fairly represent the absent interests. Some could represent all, and the
case could then proceed to a conclusion.6 In the words of Lord Eldon in
Cockburn v. Thompson7
The strict rule is that all persons materially interested in the subject of
the suit, however numerous, ought to be parties: that there may be a com-
plete decree between all parties having material interests: but that, being
a general rule, established for the convenient administration of justice,
must not be adhered to in cases to which, consistently with practical con-
venience, it is incapable of application. The principle [of parties] being
founded in convenience, a departure from it has been said to be justifiable
where necessary; and in all these cases the court has not hesitated to depart
from it, with the view by original and subsequent arrangement to do all
that can be done for the purposes of justice; rather than hold that no jus-
tice shall subsist...
Among the most common instances in which the class suit doctrine
was applied were actions by or against voluntary unincorporated associa-
tions to enforce or defend an action which the association had against an
adversary. One of the earliest was Chancey v. May." There a bill was
brought by the treasurer and manager of the Temple Mills brass works,
on behalf of themselves and all other proprietors, against the former
manager and treasurer, to account for misappropriations of funds of the
partnership, amounting to some £50,000. The defendants demurred to
the bill on the ground that there were some eight-hundred persons in the
partnership who should be made parties in order to avoid a multiplicity
of suits. The demurrer was overruled because
s.. it was in behalf of themselves and others ... so all the rest were in
effect parties and ... it would be impracticable to make them all parties
by name and there would be continual abatements by death and other-
wise, and no coming at justice, if all were to be made parties.'
So also, where a philanthropic institution sought an accounting of the
sums received by the defendants and the defendants' plea alleged that a
'Adair v. New River Co., 11 Ves. Jr. 429, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (1805); Cockburn v.
Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1809); Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swans.
277, 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (1818); Small v. Attwood, Younge 406, 159 Eng. Rep.
1051 (1832).
"16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1809).
'Prec. Ch. 592, 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (1722).
9 Ibid.
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great number of persons were the proprietors of the institution, the mo-
tion that these persons be made parties to the litigation, was overruled.
The court insisted that it would be impossible to bring in all of the per-
sons interested; hence it must be instituted by some on behalf of alL10
Whether the rights of the group were being asserted, or were being
defended of course made no practical difference. The same principles
which applied to the assertion of association rights similarly applied to
the case in which the association defended. In City of London v. Rich-
mond" the City had leased certain water conduits to an individual who
had agreed in the lease to pay a certain sum each year. The original
lessee assigned the lease in trust for such persons as should buy shares.
In an action by the city to recover the arrears the defendants objected
that not all the owners of the shares of the lease had been made parties.
But here, too, the court permitted the action to proceed by representation.
In these and other decisions' 2 the right that is being asserted or de-
fended can be viewed as a joint right. All the members of the associa-
tion stand in the same capacity; they are in a sense united in interest.
The right of one is the right of all, and the benefits which are sought
and derived inure to the group as such (at least insofar as the litigation
is concerned) and not to each individual. The interests of all are identi-
cal, but each individual is not entitled to separate relief. It is only insofar
as he is a member of the group asserting or defending a joint right that
he has an interest, and to require all members of the group to be made
parties of record in such situations would be unnecessary and would, in
the words of the chancellors, defeat justice.
But equity did not restrict the class doctrine to cases in which the
group could be viewed as a unit. Where each individual had a separate
and distinct interest or right, but the interest was the same as many others,
the doctrine was also applied. The early cases involving separate and
distinct rights were those dealing with remnants of feudalism in seven-
teenth century England.' 3 Problems arose which required the settlement
of controversies involving common lands, or the common mill, or tithes
and other duties.14  Each member of the community had, in the settle-
"Other cases of voluntary associations- Small v. Attwood, Younge 406, 159 Eng.
Rep. 1051 (1832), Baldwin v. Lawrence, 2 Sim. & Stu. 17, 57 Eng. Rep. 251
(1824); Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. Jr. 397, 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (1807); Lloyd v.
Loaring, 6 Ves. Jr. 774, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (1802); Cullen v. Duke of Queensberry,
1 Bro. Ch. 101, 28 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1781).
"2 Vern. 421, 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (1701).
"Note 10, supra.
"See CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuITY 200 (1950).
" Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1809); Chaytor v.
Trinity College, 3 Anst. 841, 145 Eng. Rep. 1056 (1796); Brown v. Vermuden, 1
Ch. Cas. 271, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676) (probably the earliest reported case).
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ment of such disagreements between himself and the lord of the manor
or the vicar, an interest which was common to all other members of the
village or parish. In these cases there was no need to attempt to bring
all the parties before the court, as one who stood in the same relation
could try the right for all the rest. In these decisions equity gave recog-
nition to multiple party action by "representation."
In Brown v. Vermuden 5 the Parson of Worselworth brought a bill
against Vermuden to have performance of a decree that he had previously
obtained against certain workers of lead mines declaring his right to
tithes. Vermuden pleaded that he was not a party to the previous decree
and insisted that he ought not be prosecuted by this bill. His plea, how-
ever, was overruled. While in Chaytor v. Trinity College'( some owners
and occupiers of lands within a certain district were permitted to sue
for themselves and the other occupiers of lands to establish the right to
pay money in lieu of tithes of hay and agistment in the township.
The interest of the individual in these and other cases was completely
separate and distinct; yet each person was a member of a group in privity
with the lord or the vicar, so that it may be said that there was a common
interest among the numerous persons which was being asserted or de-
fended. Implied as essential to the maintenance of the class suit, in
these cases at least, was privity and a common or general right or de-
fense against the adversary. The requirement of privity was later re-
moved 17 but that of the common or general right has remained to this
day.
Even though the interests of the members of the multitude were not
joint or unitary, as in the association cases, and even though no privity
existed, the class device was a convenient procedure to determine a com-
mon issue in situations involving separate and distinct interests. In At-
torney General v. HeelisR 8 certain persons, tenants and occupiers of
houses in Great Bolton sued, on behalf of themselves and all others who
were assessed, to avoid a payment of a rate that had been levied. Since
the object of the bill was to avoid the payment of the assessment every
individual assessed had in that respect one common interest which would
' 1 Ch. Cas. 271, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676).
"83 Anst. 841, 145 Eng. Rep. 1056 (1796).
'Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Ark. 282, 26 Eng. Rep. 180 (1737). Although
technically a bill of peace, the court entertained the action on the ground of avoid-
ance of multiplicity of suits since the determination of the right of fishery would
affect many others. In this sense it can be said to apply to the class device: The
court relied on London v. Perkins, III Brown 602, 1 Eng. Rep. 1524 (1734) where
the city of London claimed to be entitled to levy duties upon all ships bringing
cheese to London. The City filed a bill against certain individuals who refused to
pay the duty.
" 2 Sim. & St. 67, 57 Bog. Rep. 270 (1824).
19551
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
be beneficial to all. While each owner and occupier had owned a dis-
tinct parcel and had a distinct interest in the avoidance of the assessment
that interest was sufficiently common that the class device was held a
proper method to determine the validity of the assessment. The relief
sought affected all, and the common determination disposed of the liti-
gation.
So, too, in cases involving creditors, the propriety of the class device
was recognized. If, in an action against the representative of a deceased
debtor for an account and application of assets to the payment of debts,
it were necessary that all the creditors of the deceased debtor be made
parties to the suit, the same practical objections that arose in other cases
would exist. Hence, one or more creditors could sue for himself and all
others for an account and application of the estate of the deceased
debtor.19 If one of the creditors having the same common interest (the
application of the assets to the payment of the debts) sued, the other
creditors were allowed to come in under the decree and present their
claims.10 The basic reason for this procedure was to relieve the estate of
the burden of defending many actions.21
It was in the light of this history that Mr. Justice Story, the first in-
fluential American writer to examine the practice of English chancery,
succinctly stated the conclusions of the English decisions.22  In his COM-
MENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, he arranged the English decisions
into three categories:
1) Where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one
or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole.
2) Where the parties form a voluntary association for public or private
purposes, and those who sue or defend, may fairly be presumed to
represent the rights and interests of the whole.
3) Where the parties are very numerous, and though they have, or may
have separate and distinct interests yet it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court.m
"
9 Law v. Rigby, 4 Bro. C.C. 61, 29 Eng. Rep. 779 (1792); Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves.
Sen. 312, 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (1751); Neve v. Weston, 3 Ark. 558, 26 Eng Rep.
1121 (1747).
'See Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Sr. 312, 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (1751). In Neve v.
Wfeston, 3 Ark. 558, 26 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1747) the Chancellor stated that a credi-
tor who attempted to bring a new bill against the executor of a deceased was not
permitted to do so pending a suit by another creditor for all, as he was a quasi party
to the pending suit.
1 DANIELL, CHANCERY PRAC. 174 (8th ed. 1914).
2STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS 15 (2d ed. 1840).
This classification although influential is not accurate. Class one- where the ques-
tion is one of a common or general interest is implied and necessary for both dasses
two and three. If class three were taken literally such cases as Jones v. Garcia Del
Rio, 1 Turn & R. 297, 37 Eng. Rep. 1113 (1823) would be wrong. This case is
discussed later.
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In his first class he limited his discussion to actions brought by sea-
men24 and creditors and legatees. 25  And in his third class, where the
only requirement appeared to be mere numbers, he limited his discussion
to decisions involving feudal dues or rights. In this latter use of language
he is not historically correct. The mere fact that there is a large group of
persons having separate and distinct interests did not permit English
chancery to take jurisdiction of a cause. The class device could only be
used where the individual members of the group had separate and distinct
rights and there was a common bond among the members -either in the
subject matter, the object of the action or the relationship of the parties.
Where the interests of the individual members of the group were sepa-
rate, distinct and purely personal and not tied to the crowd, and the ob-
ject of the action was to compensate an individual right, the mere fact
that the parties were numerous would not sustain the class device. This
was recognized for the first time by Calvert20 when he stated:
The propriety of making a person a party may depend on something
personal to himself; for instance upon his participation in a fraud, or his
possession of certain information... [then] it is manifest, that the person
must be actually before the court.
Jones v. Garcia Del Ria2T was the first case to promulgate this rule.
There, a bill was filed by three persons on behalf of themselves and all
the other holders of shares of a Peruvian loan, against an impostor who
represented himself to be a lawful agent of the Peruvian government.
The impostor, presumably empowered to contract for a loan for the use
of his government, issued a prospectus and proceeded to sell shares to
numerous purchasers. Alleging fraud and misrepresentation, the plain-
tiffs prayed that an account be taken of the monies which they had ad-
vanced and that they be declared entitled to have returned what had been
paid. Lord Eldon denied relief in this form since each person had a de-
mand at law. It would appear that this decision stands solely for the
proposition that the class device is not applicable where numerous persons
have been defrauded by a single act of the defendant and each victim is
entitled to compensation. But other considerations were involved. Al-
though Lord Eldon denied the right of the plaintiffs to bring the action
in a representative form on "that ground alone," the decision injected
extraneous issues which cannot be ignored. Peru had had a revolution,
2 Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. Jun. 396, 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (1807).
'A discussion concerning the doctrine of "virtual representation" involving heirs
or legatees is beyond the scope of this paper. See 3 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §
672 (1936).
2'CALVERT, PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY 22 (2d ed. 1847).
"1 Turn & R. 296, 37 Eng. Rep. 1113 (1823).
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and the de facto government which had been set up was not recognized
by the King of England. Commenting on this, Lord Eldon stated,
If individuals in this country choose to advance their money for the
purpose of assisting a colony opposed to its parent state, that parent state
being at peace with this country, will the Courts of Justice here assist them
to recover their money?
In summary, equity was cognizant of the problems arising from mul-
tiple party fact situations and quickly adapted its procedure to meet the
need and created the doctrine of the class action. The requirements,
therefore, laid down by equity seem to be only two:
1) There must be such a number of persons involved making it
impracticable completely to settle the controversy.
2) There must be either a joint interest [as in the association cases]
or a community of interest among the numerous persons having separate
and distinct interests in the object of the suit or the subject matter in-
volved.
THE CODE PROVISIONS
The general outlines and principles of the class suit doctrine laid
down by the English chancellors and Story's interpretation of them had
great influence upon codification of that doctrine. This escape from the
normal equitable principles had become so ingrained in the procedural
processes that no codifier could ignore them. Yet it is surprising that the
first report by the Field Commission to the Legislature of New York did
not contain any reference to that equitable doctrine.28 Nor was there
such a code provision when the Code of Procedure became the law of
New York in 1848.29 Not until the amendment of 1849 was there codi-
fication of the equitable principles, and this was attached to the provision
relating to compulsory joinder.30 This New York codification was copied
into practically all of the codes of procedure throughout the United States.
While there is some variation in the language of the various state
provisions, the usual provision finds expression in the principle:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many
persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very numer-
" FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS § 99
(1848).
'N.Y. LAws, c. 379 (1848).
"'N.Y. CODE § 119 (1849). "Of the parties to the action, those who are united in
interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants ... and when the question is one
of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole." Notice the similarity of the
language to that of Mr. Justice Story, note 23, supra.
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ous, and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."
NATuRE AND PuRPosE OF SUIT UNDER CODE PROVISION
The above codification of the procedural device, commonly referred
to as the "dass action" or "representative action ' 32 is simply a recognition
and codification of the equitable doctrines. The nature of the suit; as
interpreted by the decisions under code provisions is such that certain
parties may be omitted where their interests are represented by those in-
dividuals who ar6 parties of record. Where the individuals in the group
concerned are so nunerous that it would be highly impracticable or in-
convenient to bring them all into the litigation, one or a few persons
whose interests are the same, and who would fairly insure the representa-
tion of the interests of those who are omitted, are permitted to represent
all the rest to enforce or defend the interest being asserted or defended.3 3
Various reasons have been advanced by the state courts to justify this
remedial device. Some courts reason that the purpose of such actions is
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, 34 or to prevent a failure of justice,35 or
that constant and continued abatement by death or removal from the juris-
"ALASKA COMp. LAws ANN. § 55:3-16 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN § 27-809(1947); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. Pt 2, tit. 3 § 382 (1953); FLA. Eg. Rule 14;
IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 5-316 (1948); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-220 (Burns 1933);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 60-413 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540. 02 (1947);
MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 93-2821 (1947); REv. STAT. NEB. § 25-319 (1943);
NEV. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 8558 (1929); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-601 (1941);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. § 195 (1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-70 (1953); N.D. REV.
CODE § 28-1208 (1943); OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.21 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
S 233 (1941); ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 9.106 (1940); S.C. CODE 5 10-205
(1952); S.D. CODE § 33-0410 (1939); WAsH." REv. CODE § 4.08.070 (1951);
WIs. STAT. § 260.12 (1951); Wo. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 3-616 (1945).
"See the various uses of the term "representative" in McLaughlin, The Mystery of
the Representative Suit, 26 GEo. L J. 878 (1938).
"The general nature of the class action under the code provision is stated in New-berry Library v. Bd. of Education, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944). "The class
suit is recognized as an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in
suits where the number of those interested in the subject matter of the litigation is
so great that it is impracticable to join them as parties. In such cases where the in-
terests of those not joined are the same as the interests of those who are, and thosejoined as parties fairly represent those not joined in the litigation of issues in'which
all have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree." This language is
substantially the same as in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41, 61 Sup. Ct. 115, 118(1940). RESTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS § 86 (1954).
"Whaley v. Comm., 110 Ky. 154, 61 S.W. 35 (1901); Guffanti v. National
Surety Co., 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909).
'Campbell v. Webb, 258 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1953); Bouton v. City of Brooklyn,
15 Barb. 375, 7 How. Pr. 198 (N.Y. 1853); State v. Board of County Comm., 188
Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542 (1940).
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diction would prevent the suit from being completeda The more basic
reason however, as indicated by the prior equitable decisions, is that the
device is a mere matter of convenience. Where parties are too numerous
to be brought before the court, the courts, for the sake of convenience,
and in order to adjust the differences that affect the numerous parties,
permit one who has a common interest to stand for all.37 While it is
true that the class doctrine is a device based on convenience it should be
noted that the term "convenience" is not intended to mean that the class
device is a proper method to settle all legal controversies involving mul-
tiple parties. The term should be used in a restrictive sense under the
decided cases; it is "convenient" to omit certain individuals from the rec-
ord of the proceedings since their interests are before the court as quasi-
parties.
Any one or all of the above reasons are justifications for the doctrine.
While the decisions may not be in agreement as to the exclusive or
proper justification, they have uniformly interpreted the code provisions
as mere statutory enactments of the principles formerly applied in
equity.38 Statements can be found to the effect that the provisions relate
both to legal and to equitable daims.3 9 But the qualification must be made
that they apply only where the rights of the parties are in common with
each other so that the benefit of the judgment inures to the whole class
and not to individual members thereof.
An examination of the cases in which the problem has been raised
indicates that the doctrine is applied in legal actions in at least two situ-
ations. First, in actions for the recovery of land40 and second, in suits
where the parties actually on the record are members of a class, and the
benefit of a judgment inures to the whole class. Thus, in Platt v. Colvin4l
the plaintiff as representative of some one thousand persons owning
' Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893).
-POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 439 (5th ed. 1929).
' Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890; George v.
Benjamin, 100 Wis. 622, 76 N.W. 619 (1898); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 440
(5th ed. 1929); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 396 (1947).
'Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N.E. 335 (1933); Kirk v. Young, 2 Abb.
Pr. 453 (N.Y. 1856); Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893); POM-
EROY, CODE REMEDIES 441 (5th ed. 1929). Cf. Niehaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son
Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180, 185 (1942): "... the rule which
permits a few persons to sue for themselves and others similarly situated is one of
equitable cognizance and in this state is not to be extended in its application to cases
wholly lacking in equitable features ......
'"Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, 221 Fed. 590 (6th Cir. 1915);
Thomas v. Jones, 97 N.C. 121, 1 S.E. 692 (1887); Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C.
29, 65 S.E. 953 (1909).
" 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893).
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shares in a joint stock association brought an action to recover money
which the defendants had conspired to and did carry away from its of-
fices. The defendants demurred on the ground that the other members
of the joint stock association were not parties to the suit. The court per-
mitted the action in the representative form, reversing the lower court.
While this was an action at law, the recovery was for the benefit of all
the members of the class in their group and not their individual capacity.
'When, therefore, it is stated that the code action applies to legal as well
as equitable causes, the parties must have a unity of interest in the re-
covery, and not an individual and separate legal right of recovery.
CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION OF STATuTE
Although the code provision is stated in the disjunctive, the courts
indicate that both requirements of a common or general interest and nu-
merous parties must be satisfied. The mere fact that the parties are nu-
merous does not satisfy the statute unless there is further a "common or
general interest. '42 'While some courts have indicated that a "common
question" is sufficient although the parties are not numerous43 no court
has permitted an action based on mere numbers of parties where there is
no community of interest. 44
There must be such a number of parties involved that it would be
impracticable to bring them all before the court. If the first clause of
the code section is applied, however, it would seem that "many" persons
having a question in common satisfies the statute. Although decisions
have indicated that as few as three have constituted "many"45 the im-
portant thing to consider is that the code provision was intended to ap-
ply to cases in which the parties were so numerous that it would be im-
practicable to bring them all before the court. This consideration is
recognized in the second clause of the statute which requires "very nu-
merous" persons. The wording of the two clauses is unfortunate, for his-
tory shows that the class device was used only when the parties were so
numerous that they could not all be made parties of record. The result
of the wording has been to cause confusion. What number is sufficient
to permit the application of the code provision varies with the judge's
' Garfien v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155 (1935); Lile v. KeFauver, 244
Ky. 486, 51 S.W.2d 473 (1932).
'"McKenzie v. L'Amoureaux, 11 Barb. 516 (N.Y. 1851); Hilton Bridge v. Foster,
26 Misc. 338, 57 N.Y. Supp. 140 (1899).
" POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 437 (5th ed. 1929) indicates that the language of the
code does not in terms require any question of common or general interest in the
second clause of the provision, but it is stated that it would be difficult to conceive
of an action in which a very large number of persons should be capable of joining
as plaintiffs- so large that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the
court -unless the question to be determined was one of common or general interest.
" McKenzie v. L'Amoureaux, 11 Barb. 516 (N.Y. 1851).
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fancy, and no accurate determination can be made. Each case must stand
on its own facts.46 As few as three,47 or four 48 has been sufficient under
the first clause of the code, and fifty49 has been held to be "numerous."
The representative or representatives of the class must fairly represent
all those for whom they act. As stated in Spear v. H. V. Greene Co.:50
Class bills may be maintained where a few individuals are fairly repre-
sentative of the legal and equitable rights of a large number who cannot
be readily joined as parties. The persons suing as representatives of a
class must show by the allegations of their bill that all persons whom they
profess to represent have a common interest...
The representative is also required to show by the allegations in the
complaint that his interest is in harmony with those who are repre-
sented.51 Not only must the representative fairly insure the representa-
tion of the absent members, but there must also be a sufficient number
of representatives to insure a fair trial.52  The representatives must be a
member of the class which they purport to represent.
There must be an ascertained class. That is, there must be a group
of individuals who are bound together by some common interests. The
class, of course, may be large. In Parker v. University of Delaware53 the
class consisted of all Negro persons in the State of Delaware who would
have the privilege of attending the University if the plaintiff were suc-
cessful. The court stated:
Here there is a class and it is well-defined. Those Delaware Negroes
who are legally interested in obtaining a college education, and legally in-
terested in a determination of their constitutional right with respect to
admission to the University constitute a definite class within the meaning
of the rule of court governing class actions.
There must be a "common or general interest" among the members
of the class before the class device under the code provision may be main-
"For a more detailed discussion of the code cases involving numbers, see Wheaton,
Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L. Q. 399, 412
(1934).
,
t Note 45, supra.
SClimax Speciality Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y. Supp. 822
(1907).
"Libby v. Norris, 142 Mass. 246, 7 N.E. 919 (1886).
m 246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923).
"McClelland v. Rose, 247 Fed. 721 (5th Cir. 1918); City of Lakeland v. Chase Na-
tional Co., 159 Fla. 783, So.2d 833 (1947); Sparks v. Robinson, 115 Ky. 453, 74
S.W. 176 (1903); Castle v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 346, 89 N.W. 156 (1902);
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 438 (5th ed. 1929).
' Adelbert College of Western Reserve Univ. v. Toledo W. & W. Ry. Co., 3 Ohio
N.P 15 (1894).
"31 Del. Ch. 381, 75 A.2d 225 (1950).
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tained. This phrase has caused considerable confusion. While the whole
population may be said to be bound together by common interest, the
common interest involved in class litigations must of necessity be a nar-
row and limited interest which will prove beneficial or adverse to the
holders. While it is universally recognized that there must be community
of interest among the members of the class, nowhere is that phrase de-
fined or clarified. The statutory provision requires that the question be
one of a "common or general interese to the persons who are many or
too numerous to be brought before the court. These words, either stand-
ing alone or in context in the clause have been most perplexing. Does
this requirement mean that the parties must be "united in interest" before
it is proper to bring the action in a representative form? Does the "ques-
tion" mean a question of fact or law? Does the code require that there
must be a "common" interest in the subject matter of the litigation or a
"common interest" in the object of the suit, or in the relief to be ob-
tained? Must the interests of the various parties be joint or common or
may they be separate and distinct interests, each person having a separate
right of action or defense, but tied together by a common bond of fact
or law? Must the interests of the individuals depend upon the same
basic factors, or arise from a common source, or may their interests arise
from separate and independent sources before the code provision will be
applied? If the persons are permitted to join in the suit, may a repre-
sentative suit serve the same purpose? These questions as such have
never been considered by the courts, and the result has been confusion
in determining the boundaries and meaning of "question" and "common
interest."
These questions, of course, are crucial An answer to them determines
the limits and effectiveness of the action under the code.54 The decisions
usually state the requirement in general language. A person who under-
takes to sue or defend as a representative of a class must have such a
right or interest in common with the persons represented.5 5 Only if there
"'In City of Lakeland v. Chase National Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So.2d 833 (1947)
the court recognizes these problems - and apparently is the only court to do so. The
court stated: "The statute authorized class representation when 'the question' is one
of common or general interest. A 'question' related to what? Question of fact or
law? A question related to the 'subject matter' of the suit, or to the 'object' of the
suit? A 'question' related to a common right-to several rights? or- to joint
rights? If the 'interest' be 'common or general' may the rights be separate and dis-
tinct? Also must they depend on the same basic factors? Is the rule a matter of
indulgence when joinder would otherwise be required? Or is it a matter of con-
venienve for the benefit of the parties and the court?"
'Lile v. Kefauver, 244 Ky. 486, 51 S.W.2d 473 (1932); Spear v. H. V. Greene
Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923); Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937); Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. &
Light Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83 N.W. 851 (1900).
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is a community of interest is the suit maintainable in the representative
form.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DECISIONS CONSTRUING THE
CODE PROVISION
Before attempting to determine the nature of the "community of in-
terest" required under the code provision and in order fully to understand
the limitations of the class device, it might be profitable to make a classi-
fication of the decisions construing the code provision. The decisions
under the code and the equitable decisions prior to the code appear to
fall into four more or less separate classes: 5 6
1) Those cases in which the parties are very numerous so that it
would be impracticable to bring them all before the court and the mem-
bers of the class have interests which are united or joint.57
2) Those cases in which the parties are very numerous and all the
individual members of the class have "common" or identical interests in
the determination of the litigation.58
3) Those cases in which the parties are very numerous and the
individual members of the class have separate and distinct rights or in-
terests, but all the members of the class are interested in the identical
relief sought or in the identical subject matter involved.59
4) Those cases in which the parties are very numerous, and the
individual members of the class have separate and distinct interests, and
'See a similar scheme of classification in McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Repre-
sentative Suit, 26 GEO. L. J. 878 (1938).
'Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893); Small v. Atwood, Younge
406, 159 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1832).
'Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853); Penny v. Central Coal & Coke Co.,
138 Fed. 769 (8th Cir. 1905); Wheelock v. First Presb. Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51
Pac. 841 (1897); Bates v. Houston, 66 Ga. 198 (1880); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind.
App. 177, 179 N.E. 335 (1932); In re Taylor, 265 App. Div. 858, 37 N.Y.S.2d
675 (1942); Hodges v. Nalty, 104 Wis. 464 (1899).
'Birmingham v. Fairview Home Owners Ass'n, 66 So.2d 775 (Ala. 1953); Coach-
ella Val. County Water Dist. v. Stevens, 275 Pac. 538 (Cal. 1928); Jones v. New-
Ion, 81 Colo. 25, 253 Pac. 386 (1927); Parker v. Univ. of Del., 31 Del. Ch. 381,
75 A.2d 225 (1950); Tenney v. Miami Beach, 152 Fla. 126, 11 So.2d 188 (1942);
Sweeney v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 465, 218 S.W.2d 30 (1949); Peoples Store v. Mc-
Kibbin, 379 IIi. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942); Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297
(1885); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287
(1938); Haggerty v. Squire, 137 Ohio St. 207, 28 N.E.2d 554 (1940); Crane v.
Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 50 Dauph. 401 (Pa. Com. PL. 1941); Kelly v. Tiner, 91
S.C. 41, 74 S.E. 30 (1912); Perkins & Co. v. Diking Dist., 162 Wash. 227, 298
Pac. 462 (1931); Trade Press Pub. Co. v. Milwaukee Typo. Union, 180 Wis. 449,
193 N.W. 507 (1923). Cf. Dinkes v. Glen Oaks, 206 Misc. 143, 132 N.Y.S.2d
138 (1954).
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each individual is entitled to separate and distinct relief from every other
member of the group. This is the situation which primarily concerns
Us.6 0
These cases can be further classified into those involving separate and
distinct rights- arising from a common source or transaction, and those
arising from separate and distinct sources or transactions.
Classification (1) above can be illustrated by the situation wherein a
joint stock company or partnership consists of many members, and the
association seeks to enforce or defend a claim. All the members of the
association are united in interest since the right which they are seeking
to enforce would inure to their united benefit. In this situation it is cer-
tainly unnecessary for all to be made parties, the action can be brought
by a few for the benefit of the rest and the adversary can be released from
liability once and for all. This category is the typical "representative"
action.
Classification (2) above is so closely related to class (1) that it is
difficult to separate the two. But in doing so, analysis of the problem
is aided. This class of cases can be best illustrated by voluntary organi-
zations, which do not particularly have a unity of interest, but in which
the members of the organization are tied together by a common interest
in the association. Decisions involving church organizations are illus-
trative. In Bates v. Houston6' the trustees of a church, on behalf of
themselves and other members of the religious body, sought to restrain
unlawful and unchristian behavior on the part of the defendants and
were successful in so doing. And in Hodges v. Nalty62 several members
of St Victor's church, an unincorporated religious society, sued to recover
an unpaid subscription that the defendant had signed in order to defray
' Cherry v. Howell, 4 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. N.Y. 1931); Bickford's v. Federal Reserve
Bank of N.Y., 5 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); Michelsen v. Penney, 10 F. Supp.
537 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Ry. Express Agency v. Jones, 106 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.
1939); Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn., 190 P.2d 626 (Cal. 1948),
af'd, 198 P.2d 514 (1948); City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat. Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32
So.2d 833 (1947); O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 195 S.E. (1938);
Kimes v. City of Gary, 224 Ind. 294, 66 N.E.2d 888 (1946); Codell Const. Co. v.
Miller, 304 Ky. 708, 202 S.W.2d 394 (1947); Locke v. City of Detroit, 335 Mich.
29, 55 N.W.2d 161 (1952); Thorn v. Hormel & Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W.
516 (1940); Neihaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164
S.W.2d 180 (1942); Archer v. Musick, 147 Nebr. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946),
REV'D, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947); Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece,
281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939); Sutton Carpet Cleaners v. Firemen's Ins. Co.,
68 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1947); State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32,
104 N.E.2d 1 (1952); Mathews v. Landowners Oil Assn., 204 S.W.2d 647 (TEX.
1947); McMichen v. Amos, 25 Va. 134 (1826); Hawarden v. The Youghiogheny
& Lehigh Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
- 66 Ga. 198 (1880).
' 104 Wis. 464, 80 N.W. 726 (1899).
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the cost of building a new church. In these and other situations the con-
gregation, or the members, have a community of interest in restraining
the unlawful behavior or in recovering the unpaid subscription. It can-
not be said that each individual member has a separate and distinct right
of action against the wrongdoer. Each member of the congregation could
not sue alone if he so desired- for his interests are interwoven with
those of the other members of the congregation, and in that sense it can
be said that he has a "common interest" with all the members of the
class. Illustrative also of this group of cases are the modern suits involv-
ing labor unions, where statutory authorization is not granted to sue in
the name of the union.63
These situations are not difficult. If the aggregate is looked upon as
a unit, composed of several members, then there can be no difficulty in
permitting one of the unit to represent the group to enforce or defend a
right which exists for the unit.
The more difficult problems confronting the court arise in classes (3)
and (4) where the interests of the group are not regarded as unitary, but
rather are separate and distinct, and each individual member of the ag-
gregation has an important personal interest in seeking recovery against
the adversary. In these cases, the "common question" principle becomes
important, and here there is great disagreement as to the meaning of the
term. In what situations, therefore, can it be said that the code provision
applies the term "common or general interest" to cases involving indi-
viduals who have a separate and distinct claim against the adversary?
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT RIGHTS AND A COMMON QUESTION
IN A FUND OR SUBJECT MATTER
Many decisions indicate that where the parties are numerous, but each
has a right or interest which is separate and distinct, one or more may
represent the group if all the members have a community of interest and
are interested in a particular fund or subject matter involved in the liti-
gation. The community of interest-the "common or general interest"
- lies in the fund or property involved.64  The separate interest that
each person has must be an interest in a trust fund, an insolvent estate, a
mortgage or some other tangible interest.
'Oster v. Bro. of Locomotive Fireman, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921); Pickett
v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906). Modern enactments and decisions
permit the entity to be sued or to sue: U.M.W. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344 (1922); see 29 U.S.C. § 185 (b) (Labor Management Relations Act, 1947).
" Bickford's v. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., 5 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); N.Y.
Cloak & Suit House v. Coston, 64 Cal. App. 94, 270 Pac. 695 (1928); Mitchell v.
Hart, 107 Ind. App. 548, 25 N.E.2d 665 (1939); Lile v. Kefauver, 244 Ky. 486,
51 S.W.2d 473 (1932); Kahlmeyer v. Green-Wood Cemetery, 175 Misc. 187, 23
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1940).
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Gulffanti v. National Surety Co.65 presents a typical case. There, one
Zanolini was depositary of sums deposited by 150 persons for transmis-
sion to Italy. Zanolini converted the money to his own use and, after
being declared a bankrupt, absconded. More than one hundred and fifty
depositors now had claims against him, and the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion in equity on behalf of himself and other creditors against the de-
fendant bonding company which had insured the various deposits. The
court permitted the action to stand in representative form, expressly stat-
ing that the statute requiring bonds was to deter irresponsible parties
from engaging in such business and to provide a fund to indemnify
creditors. "Such fund," the court stated, "I think, is not for one creditor
but for all, and should be equitably distributed among all according to
their respective claims." Each creditor's claim here was distinct, and
each creditor's claim accrued as soon as the default occurred; the creditors
had equal rights to the fund and they should therefore be satisfied from
the proceeds of that fund.66
Where each individual bondholder or certificate holder has a distinct
interest in his bond, apart from others, one of the bondholders has been
allowed to enforce the lien or foreclose the mortgage securing the issue.67
In Gibson v. American Loan and Trust Co.68 an action was brought by
owners of 85 out of 150 bonds secured by a mortgage upon the property
of a water company. The mortgage was executed and delivered to the
defendant in trust for all bondholders. The owners of the eighty-five
bonds representing themselves and all others sought to remove the trustee
for improper action in subordinating their mortgage to expenditures al-
leged to have been made for improvements and to foreclose the mortgage.
The court, in indicating that this was proper procedure, stated:
Neither can the action be defeated for the reason that all the owners
of bonds secured by the mortgage are not made parties to it; for it has
been brought by the plaintiffs, as the owners of eighty-five of the bonds
forming more than a majority of those secured by the mortgage, and they
are prosecuting it under the authority of. . the code....
133 App. Div. 610, 118 N.Y. Supp. 207 (1909), a! 'd, 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E.
174 (1909).
' Not only was this a permissive representative suit, but the court indicated that the
creditor who sues, although his claim is distinct from all others, must sue for the
benefit of all.
'Carter v. Rodewald, 108 Ill. 351 (1884); Gibson v. American Loan Co., 12 N.Y.
Supp. 444 (1890); Clay v. Selah Vallery Irr. Co., 14 Wash. 543, 45 Pac. 141
(1896); Adelbert College of Western Reserve Univ. v. Toledo Wabash & Western
Ry. Co., 3 Ohio N.P. 15 (1894); Atkins v. Trowbridge, 162 App. Div. 629, 148
N.Y. Supp. 181 (1914); Hilton Bridge Co. v. Foster, 26 Misc. 338, 57 N.Y. Supp.
140 (1899); In re 1030 No. Dearborn Bldg. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Il.
1934).
' 12 N.Y. Supp. 444 (1890).
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In all of the above decisions, the court either expressly, or impliedly
indicated that the "common interest" which existed between all members
of the class existed, in the fund, in the trust, or in the tangible property.
Conversely, if individuals have separate and distinct interests which do
not inhere in an ascertained physical subject, many cases hold that no re-
lief by means of the class remedy can be obtained. This view is expressly
shown by two recent decisions.
In the first,69 the question presented to the court was whether three
creditors of an insolvent bank could maintain an action against the bank
directors to enforce a statutory liability for declaring dividends when the
corporation was insolvent. The three representatives were depositors of
the bank, and they sought to represent more than 1500 other depositors
whose deposits amounted to more than $400,000. The chancellor sus-
tained the motion of the defendants to require plaintiffs to elect whose
cause of action they would prosecute and in whose name the same would
be prosecuted. The court of appeals sustained the trial chancellor on the
ground that the claim of each of the creditors of the bank was distinct
and individual and there was "no common security or fund in which they
have a collective or community of interest." Each person was only a
creditor of the bank and had a separate right of action. Although it was
recognized that the claims of the depositors arose under the same statute
and involved the same questions of law and fact, their claims were entirely
separate and distinct and one could not sue for all. The language of the
court was:
And as pointed out in notes and cases cited under section 25 [the class
section] of the Civil Code of Practice, it is not sufficient that the rights of
the various creditors may be determined upon the same law and facts, or
that the common or general interest be in questions of law raised by the
pleadings, but there must be a common and general interest in the subject
matter of the action to authorize one or more to maintain an action for all.
The court was undoubtedly hesitant to grant the type of relief requested
here, fearing that such a decision would amount to a precedent that all
the creditors of a common debtor would be able to sue the common
debtor in a representative type action. But the court completely over-
looked the fact that the whole controversy could have been completely
disposed of by the simple device of the representative suit.
In the second decision 70 a class suit to impress a trust upon the pro-
ceeds of certain checks collected by the defendant was refused. After re-
viewing familiar instances in which class suits were permitted, 71 the court
' Lile v. Kefauver, 244 Ky. 486, 51 S.W.2d 473 (1932).
"'Bickford's v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 5 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
'Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163 (1885) (suit by. judgment
creditor in behalf of all such creditors to reach equitable assets of debtor); Carnahan
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-recognized that if a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, it can
declare the rights of the absent persons whose interest in the subject mat-
ter is identical with that of the parties before the court. But where the
interests are separate and distinct and are merely separate claims existing
against the adversary, although involving common questions of law or
fact, the court does not have the power to permit a class suit.
These decisions indicate that the "common or general interest" re-
quirement is satisfied when there is a res before the court and the indi-
vidual claimants have the same interest in the subject of litigation. Al-
though the interests of the various members of the group are separate
and distinct, when their interest is connected by the common bond of the
tangible property, there is a "question" involving a "common or general
interest." This meaning of "common or general interest" satisfies the
code requirement.
SEPARATE AND DiSTINCr RIGHTS AND COmmON RELIEF
Suppose that an upper riparian owner is. depositing refuse into a
stream which flows into the lands of several lower owners, making it im-
possible for the lower owners to use the water for domestic and other
purposes. Or suppose that an individual in the community is commit-
ting a nuisance by permitting noxious fumes to escape from his prem-
ises, thus interfering with the enjoyment of many persons nearby. Is
such a situation, where each individual would have a separate and distinct
right of action against the upper owner or the individual committing the
nuisance, a proper one for the class device? It has been thought by at
least one court72 that such actions are not representative suits. But many
* decisions permit such actions to be brought in a "representative" form
where each of the individuals affected has a separate right of action against
the adversary, and each member of the group could have sued alone or
where.they could have joined together in the action. It may be stated,
therefore, that the decisions recognize a "representative action" when the
"representative" seeks the same or identical relief to which all would be
entitled and which would benefit all in the same way73
v. Peabody, 31 F.2d 311 (S.D. N.Y. 1929) (suit by heirs on behalf of all); Guf-
fanti v. National Surety Co., 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909) (suit by creditor
on behalf of many to get payment from fund).
'Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Lighting Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83
N.W.'851 (1900).
' Coachella Valley Cry. Water Dist. v. Stevens, 274 Pac. 538 (Cal. 1929); Jones v.
Newlon, 81 Col. 25, 253 Pac.-386 (1927); Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297
(1885); Berle, Chamberlain v. Dawkins, 150 Misc. 911, 271 N.Y. Supp. 579
(1934); Kelly v. Tiner, 91 S.C. 41, 74 S.E. 30 (1912); Perkins & Co. v. Diking
Dist., 162 Wash. 227, 298 Pac. 462 (1931); Trade Press Pub. Co. v. Moore, 180
Wis, 449, 193 N.W. 507 (1923); contra, Certia v. Notre Dame, 82 Ind. App. 542,141 N.E. 318 (1923).. .
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In Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co. 4 the plaintiff, who sued
for himself and "for the benefit of all others who are similarly situated,"
owned certain mills and water rights on the Seneca River. The defendant
had raised an upstream dam to such an extent that approximately one-
half of the water was diverted into another race. The plaintiff demanded
judgment that the defendant be required to restore the dam to its former
condition and be enjoined from interfering with the flow of water to
which the plaintiff and others were entitled. The defendant challenged
the right of the plaintiff to maintain a "representative" suit, arguing that
there is no common question among the owners in severalty of water
rights in the sense which the "common question" principle was used in
the code. The court, however, rejected the defendant's contention in these
words:
... it would seem to be clear that that interest in the subject matter of
this action and in the relief sought is of a kind which would authorize
them all to join as plantiffs, if that method were chosen, or each proprietor
could sue alone, and one can sue for all.
Here the court recognized the convenience of the class device 5 for
in granting the relief to the plaintiff, the other members of the affected
class would thereby benefit. The court here tied the class device to per-
missive joinder of parties. If joinder is permitted under the pertinent
code provisions, then it would seem that one could sue for all, for each
is entitled to the identical relief.
In Greer v. Smith76 the court permitted a "representative" suit where
many persons who owned residences in a certain area in New York City
were injured in the use of their property by the acts of the defendant in
emptying refuse into a pond and thereby polluting a brook which passed
the property of the various owners. The court found it unnecessary for
each of the 100 owners to come into court with his own complaint and
concluded that this was a situation which was included in the "common
or general interest" clause.
It is to be noted in the above decisions that the relief sought by one
would have the effect of discontinuing the wrong-doing which would
affect all the members of the group. In the case of enjoining the pollu-
tion of a stream, if one of the plaintiffs had sued alone and not in a
"representative" capacity, the injunction would have stopped the nuisance
and all persons similarly situated would have been benefited. It may be
' 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y. Supp. 822 (1907).
These cases should not be thought of as "representative" suits in the sense that one
stands for another as in the decisions involving voluntary organizations, but rather
the term "class suit" should be used to identify the litigation as a convenient device
to clear up a multi-party controversy.
155 App. Div. 420, 140 N.Y. Supp. 43 (1913).
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said then that it does not add anything to bring the suit "for all others
similarly situated." But in other decisions the identical relief sought
would not have affected all, and still the class device has been approved.
In Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & Lehigh Coal Co.77 the plaintiff, a
retail coal dealer alleged two causes of action 1) for damages by reason
of the defendant's malicious acts in destroying his business and 2) for
an injunction to restrain the conspiracy which affected plaintiff's business
and the others who were similarly situated. The defendants, wholesalers
of coal, allegedly had conspired to sell coal only to certain retailers, thus
driving the plaintiff and some other retailers out of business. The court
enjoined the defendants from continuing the conspiracy and permitted
the action to be brought in the representative form. The common ques-
tion was found in the legality of the conspiracy. "The question as to the
legality of this conspiracy is certainly one of common and general inter-
est to all persons against whom it was directed and is being enforced,"
stated the court. The same acts of conspiracy affected numerous retailers
and although the injunction, if plaintiff had sued for himself only, would
not have been effective to restrain the acts of conspiracy as they affected
the other retailers, the court permitted the class device.
In Trade Press Publishing Co. v. Milwaukee Typographical Union7 s
ten plaintiffs, all engaged in the printing business in Milwaukee and
representing all the employing printers of the city, sued to enjoin a con-
spiracy by the defendant union which attempted to force the plaintiffs
to enter into closed shop contracts. The court permitted the plaintiffs to
sue not only for themselves but for all other employing printers of the
city. Convinced that this conspiracy was aimed at a class of persons the
court said that this was a "situation where one or more of a class may sue
for their own benefit and for the benefit of others having a similar in-
terest in obtaining the relief demanded. '79
The common interest that exists in these cases consists not merely in
the subject matter involved but in the relief demanded which is identical
to each member of the class and in the "common question" presented.
It has been questioned whether these are truly representative suits.8 0
In the sense that one of the members of the group "represents" and stands
in the place of another to enforce his claim, they are not representative
suits. These actions are certainly not "representative" in the same sense
as suits involving an association which seeks to enforce a joint right of
111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
180 Wis. 449, 193 N.W. 507 (1923).
Id. at 452, 193 N.W. at 510.
'See discussion in Blume, The Common Questions Principle in the Code Provision
30 MIcH. L REv. 878, 897 (1932). See the various meanings of "representative"
in McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 GEO. L. J. 878 (1938).
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action against the defendant, or actions whereby one member of a church
organization enforces a right for the members of the congregation. The
Hawarden and Trade Press cases are substitutes for permissive joinder of
parties, and the court for purposes of convenience in avoiding a multi-
plicity of actions permits one to sue for all who find themselves in the
situation. Although the Wisconsin court in Linden Land Co. v. Milwau-
kee Electric R.R. & L. Co.81 criticized the statement that these situations
were representative suits, they are in form representative and a convenient
device for the settlement of a litigious controversy.
SEPARATE AND DISTINcr RIGHTS AND A COMMON QUESTION
OF LAW OR FACT
Many statements have been made to the effect that:
Mere community of interest in the questions of law or fact at issue in a
controversy or in the kind of relief to be afforded does not go far enough
to warrant a class suit."
Yet the fact remains that in many cases the only question of common or
general interest consisted of an identity of questions of law or fact. In
all of the cases discussed in the preceding section there was presented a
"question" of law or fact affecting the various members of the group.
Have the defendants by their action of polluting the stream injured the
various plaintiffs?83 Have the defendants by their act of diverting water
from a dam injured the various plaintiffs?8 4 Have the defendants by
their act of conspiracy deprived the plaintiffs of their right to a liveli-
hood?8 5 These questions are common to all the members of the group.
And where the relief sought by one member of the group affects each
member in precisely the same way, the courts have permitted the action
to be maintained in the representative form and have construed the com-
mon question to include a common question of law or fact.
The problem whether a class action may be maintained where there
is a community of questions of law or fact is complicated by the fact that
it is identified with another problem. This is the problem of whether
equity has jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits arising from com-
" 107 Wis. 493, 83 N.W. 851 (1900).
'Spear v. H. V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923). See also Jones
v. Healey, 56 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1945).
' Greer v. Smith, 155 App. Div. 420, 140 N.Y. Supp. 43 (1913).
" Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y. Supp. 822
(1907).
" Trade Press Publishing Co. v. Milwaukee Typographical Union, 180 Wis. 449, 193
N.W. 507 (1923).
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mon questions of law or fact.8 6 . Whether equity has jurisdiction to han-
dle legal claims which arise from a common question of law or fact is dis-
tinct from the question whether the code in administering both law and
equity, can be construed in such a manner so as to apply to a question of
law or fact which is of "common or general interest" of many persons.
The code provision has thus been construed and rightly so. The only
community of interest in the nuisance and riparian owner cases discussed
above were questions of fact. Each member of the group had a distinct
and separate right arising from one act of the defendant which required
a determination of the common fact question.
In Skinner v. Mitchell 7 one taxpayer sought on behalf of 874 similar-
ly situated taxpayers to compel the county treasurer to issue tax receipts
for money paid by the various taxpayers to the county through a bank
which was a county depository. One of the grounds for the motion to
quash the alternative writ of mandamus was that there was a misjoinder
of parties because the plaintiff had no right to maintain the action on
behalf of the other taxpayers since in each instance there was a separate
transaction. The court, relying on Pomeroy's text dealing with the pre-
vention of a multiplicity of suits stated:
In the present case the community of interest lies in the legal questions
involved, the similarity of the situation of the several taxpayers, and in the
fact that the character of relief sought would be applicable to all. The case
is one falling within the code provision and there was no misjoinder.
Not only, therefore, may the "question" refer to a common question of
fact, but to a common proposition of law.88
THE MEANING OF COMMUNITY OF- INTEREST
The code requires that the point in litigation or the "question" must
be one of common or general interest of numerous persons. This com-
munity of interest which is necessary to satisfy the code provision must
be one of three types:
For a complete discussion see POMEROY, EQUITY JuIus'RuDENcE § 255-281 (5th
ed. 1941).
' 108 Kan. 861, 197 Pac. 569 (1921). This was an action in mandamus, a legal
remedy, yet the court discusses whether there is equitable jurisdiction to prevent a
multiplicity of actions.
' Of course, many persons who are interested in a general question of law would not
be permitted to join together or to maintain a class suit. A distinction must be made
between a case like Skinner '. Mitchell where the rights of numerous persons arise
from a common source of law and a case where a.negligent defendant injures num-
erous persons in successive independent occurrences; although all the persons injured
are interested in the question of law (negligence) it is not a common question of
law since the rights are not derived from a common source.
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1) A community of interest in a voluntary or unincorporated as-
sociation, where the members of the group do not stand out as individ-
uals but are anonymous in the crowd. The group as a whole will be
benefited and not the individual as such, or
2) A community of interest in a res which is the subject matter of
the litigation. Although the interests of the various members of the
group are separate and distinct, the community of interest lies in the sub-
ject matter of litigation, or
3) A community of interest in the facts of the case or the legal
problem presented and in the identical relief sought, although the mem-
bers of the group have separate and distinct interests, and their claims for
relief arise from the same occurrence or series of occurrences.
This is the extent to which the term "community of interest" has been
used under the decisions construing the code provision. Does the court
have the power to go further and extend the meaning of community of
interest to cases involving a class, having separate and distinct interests,
where each member of the class is entitled to separate relief, when their
legal claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence (or series
thereof) and involve the same or similar questions of law or fact?
THE PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE COURTS TODAY
The courts in the past score of years have with increasing frequency
been called upon to determine the question whether a class suit may be
maintained where numerous persons acquire separate and distinct inter-
ests from the same act or similar acts of the adversary. This problem
may be exemplified by examining the factual situation in a recent case.
In Burke v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co."9 the Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion issued an order requiring telephone companies to revise, print and
distribute directories at least semi-annually.90 The Illinois Bell Company
neglected to revise its directories for subscribers of telephones in Chicago
and the suburban area. The plaintiff brought action on behalf of him-
self and all other subscribers who were similarly affected for damages
which the court called a "request for refund" under the provisions of the
Public Utilities Act. Here is a situation in which hundreds of persons
have claims against the telephone company which is by law required to
perform a particular act and has failed to do so. Each of the subscribers
has a claim for reparation which could be determined in one action by
means of the class device. The question at issue is: may this multi-party
controversy be determined and disposed of by means of the class device
under the code provision?
'348 IM. App. 529, 109 N.E.2d 358 (1952).
'o If the exchange served more than 1000 subscribers.
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The courts that have been confronted with the request to permit one
person, whose right arises from a transaction or occurrence which simi-
larly affects numerous other persons, to maintain an action in a repre-
sentative form for himself and all others affected have consistently denied
relief. In view of what has been said, this is not illogical. To say that
one person who has a distinct claim for his own personal damage can
"represent" another who is not before the court in the prosecution of his
claim against the same adversary would be stretching the principle of
"representation" far beyond the contemplation of the codifiers. No one
individual can "represent" another in his claim. Each person who has a
distinct legal interest, whether arising from a common source or not, is
master of his own claim. No one person can recover a judgment for an
aggregate sum and be permitted to hold the sum for the benefit of all
members of the group. There is, and should be, a tendency on the part
of courts not to permit one to claim money for another person even
though the effect of permitting the class suit would be to avoid multiplic-
ity of litigation. That is the reason why the state courts in construing
the code provision consistently deny the propriety of the class suit device
where one or more seek to represent a group of persons who have sepa-
rate and distinct claims, and each one is entitled to distinct relief.91
The reasons given for denying the propriety of the class device in
this type of case are many. Relief has been denied on the ground that
there is "no common interest in the question involved,"92 that such suits
do not apply to actions at law,93 that there is no fund or subject matter
'Cherry v. Howell, 4 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. N.Y. 1931); Bickford's v. Federal Re-
serve Bank of N.Y., 5 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); Michelsen v. Penney, 10 F.
Supp. 537 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn.,
32 Cal.2d 833, 190 P.2d 626 (1948), aff'd, 198 P.2d 514 (1948); City of Lake-
land v. Chase Nat. Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So.2d 833 (1947); Newberry Library v.
Ed. or Education, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944); Kimes v. City of Gary, 224
Ind. 294, 66 N.E.2d 888 (1946); Garfien v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155
(1935); Thorn v. Hormel & Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516 (1940); Niehaus
v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180 (1942);
Archer v. Musick, 147 Nebr. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946), rev'd on other grounds,
25 N.W.2d 908 (1947); Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281
N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939); Stevens v. Cindnnati Times Star Co., 72 Ohio
St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 (1905); State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio
St. 32, 104 N.E.2d 1 (1952); Covert v. Nashville C. & St. L. RR. Co., 208 S.W.2d
1008 (Tenn. 1948); Matthews v. Landowners Oil Assn., 204 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.
1947).
'Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mut. Water Co., 58 Cal. App.2d 709, 137 P.2d 757
(1943); Burke v. Ill. Bell Telephone Co., 438 Ill. App. 529, 109 N.E.2d 358
(1952); Kimes v. City of Gary, 224 Ind. 294, 66 N.E.2d 888 (1946); Union
Light Heat & Power Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S.W. 1081 (1917); Brenner
v. Tide Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937); Davies v. Colum-
bia Gas & Elec. Co., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949).
'Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Leaf, 347 Ill. App. 191, 106 N.E.2d 735 (1952); Nie-
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involved,94 that the individuals in the group are not united in interest,9 5
or that the court lacks jurisdiction of small claims and that the case was
not within the jurisdiction of the trial court.96 Many courts have denied
relief because a determination of the action would not be binding upon
those persons who are not personally before the court.97 The theory of
these courts is that a class suit is only operative when the determination
made would be binding upon all members of the class, and where one
person has a distinct claim against an opponent no other person can
prejudice his rights without his consent. A fair test of a class suit ac-
cording to many courts is "whether or not the judgment is conclusive for
or against the members of the class represented ... a result which could
not be extended to entirely separate claims of the respective members."98
CASES INVOLVING PUBLIC UTILITY CONSUMERS
There have been, in recent years a number of decisions in which
numerous consumers of public utility services have been entitled to re-
funds of overcharges as a result of a single act on the part of the utility.
Although it would seem highly desirable to settle in one action the va-
rious claims of the innumerable parties, the courts have not permitted
the use of the class device for recovering such overcharges or demands.99
The struggle of the court on the one hand to obviate a multiplicity of
suits and to provide an expeditious remedy to all individuals involved,
and on the other to comply with the requirements of the code provisions
can be best illustrated by Davies v. Gas & Electric Co.' ° ° A consumer of
haus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180
(1942).
'Cherry v. Howell, 4 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. N.Y. 1931); Watson v. Santa Carmelita
Mutual Water Co., 58 Cal. App.2d 709, 137 P.2d 757 (1943); Peoples Store of
Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942); Garfien v. Stiglitz,
260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155 (1935); Thorn v. Hormel & Co., 206 Minn. 589,
289 N.W. 516 (1940); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18
N.E.2d 287 (1938).
'Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1949); Weaver v. Pasadena Tourn-
ament of Roses Assn., 190 P.2d 626 (Cal. 1948), aff'd, 198 P.2d 514 (1948).
'Davies v. Columbia Gas and Elec. Co., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949);
Union Light Heat & Power Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S.W. 1081 (1917).
'Acton v. Johnson, 240 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1951); Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament
of Roses Assn., 190 P.2d 626 (Cal. 1948), afl'd, 198 P.2d 514 (1948); City of
Lakeland v. Chase Nat. Co., 159 Ala. 783, 32 So.2d 833 (1947); Brenner v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
'Briggs v. Technocracy Inc., 85 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1948).
"Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949),
reversing, 79 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio App. 1948); Union Light Heat & Power Co. v.
Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S.W. 1081 (1917); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas
Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
'" 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949), reversing, 79 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio App.
1948).
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natural gas sued the utility on behalf of himself and other consumers who
had purchased gas during the previous ten year period. He alleged that
the defendant was engaged in a conspiracy to dilute the natural gas dis-
tributed to consumers, by injecting into the mains inert flue gas in order
to defraud all consumers. About 700,000 consumers had been over-
charged because of this dilution. Plaintiff's prayer was for injunctive re-
lief, an accounting and damages. The Ohio court of appeals in a con-
vincing opinion held that this was a proper occasion for the class de-
vice.101 The court noted that no distinction is made between law and
equity and that the code provision is to be applied if there is a common
question of law or fact. Since the rights of action arose from a common
source and represented a like interest the matter should be litigated in one
suit.
Upon appeal, however, the supreme court reversed stating:
Here, the primary object of the action is the recovery of money in the
form of damages for all those who are allegedly defrauded by the claimed
deceitful practices of the defendants during a specified number of years....
Such amounts would depend upon the peculiar facts surrounding the par-
ticular person . . . [and] because of the diverse conditions and circum-
stances referred to, it cannot be said that there is a community of interest
plus a right of recovery based on the same essential facts between plaintiff
and those he assumes to represent....
The court further noted that some of the individuals who might be en-
tided to recovery might not wish to sue or might wish to sue for breach
of contract or restitution and not damages.
In Union Light Heat and Power Co. v. Mulligan,03 the company sup-
plied gas under a franchise which permitted it to charge a certain amount
per thousand cubic feet of gas consumed. For some time the company
had been demanding advance payments to secure payment of gas con-
sumed contrary to their franchise, and the plaintiff demanded that the
company return the money so paid. Thirty-three plaintiffs joined assert-
ing claims that aggregated only a small sun. The court made a futile at-
tempt to determine the precise nature of the "common interest" required
under the code provision, and refused to permit the plaintiffs to sue for
other consumers.
Where consumers of public utilities seek to restrain illegal charges or
to determine rights by way of declaratory judgment the obstacles of the
preceding decisions do not interfere with the propriety of the class de-
vice. In Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.10 4 the plaintiff sought an
1079 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio App. 1948).
"2151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949).
177 Ky. 662, 197 S.W. 1081 (1917).
104279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
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injunction, a declaration of rights and an accounting against the gas com-
pany for charging services for reconnections in violation of the Public
Service Law. The court said:
It is proper here to allow the representative action for the injunction
and the declaratory judgment, but not for the accounting. To maintain
a representative action the plaintiff must show that he has a cause of action
and that he is representative of a common or general interest.
CASES INVOLVING FRAUD
Many attempts have been made to use the class device to dispose of
the claims of numerous persons who have been defrauded by misrepre-
sentations pursuant to a common design or conspiracy. Although the
misrepresentations are the same or similar in their nature, no court has
as yet permitted the victims to present their claims via the class device.
However laudable it may be for the courts to provide a remedy whereby
all victims may have an inexpensive and expeditious settlement of their
claims, the courts have consistently refused to permit the claims to be
prosecuted under the code section dealing with class suits.10 5
The two most enlightening cases in this regard are Society Milion
Athena v. National Bank of Greece'"0 and Brenner v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co.10 7 In the former an action was brought by two depositors for
themselves and all others to compel the return of money deposited by
them and others in a bank which was not authorized to receive deposits
under the limited license issued to it by the New York Superintendent
of Banks. The Court of Appeals of New York reasoned that while it is
laudable to avoid a multiplicity of actions no class action could be main-
tained. Each person wronged may determine for himself the remedy
which he will seek for the wrong to him and "separate wrongs to sepa-
rate persons, though committed by similar means and even pursuant to a
single plan, do not alone create a common or general interest in those
who are wronged."' 0'  There were in this case upwards of 5000 per-
sons.1
09
"Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d
374 (1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d
890 (1937); Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp, 280 Ill. App. 151 (1935);
Cherry v. Howell, 4 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. N.Y. 1931); Note, 114 A.L.R. 1015.
108281 N.Y. 232, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939).
10276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
1281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1939).
0 It is surprising to note that in this case the plaintiffs could have properly joined
as plaintiff. The court would have permitted joinder. But to fulfill the require-
ments of permissive joinder under the N.Y. Civil Practice act it is necessary that the
claims of the several plaintiffs must arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions, a requirement that would not seem to be fulfilled if there are completely
"separate wrongs" to "separate persons."
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In the Brenner Case, plaintiffs alleged that they purchased certain cer-
tificates secured by a mortgage on property in New York. They further
alleged that they and many others were induced to purchase such certifi-
cates relying upon the fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant. In
denying the propriety of the action the court pointed out that each buyer
of a certificate acquired an individual right, based upon the wrong to the
individual buyer and that the purpose of a "representative" action is to
permit an adjudication of a question in which others are interested only
where the decree is conclusive for or against those members who are
"represented."
In these cases there may be a single design or scheme to defraud in-
nocent victims which scheme results in one act of fraud upon which
many persons rely,"1° or there may be a series of actions which are similar.
The rights of the various victims arise from a common source, and in such
a situation there is certainly a "common question" of law or fact involved.
By permitting joinder the courts recognize the fac that there are common
questions of law or fact arising from the series of transactions. There-
fore, the denial of class suits in the misrepresentation cases must be based
on other grounds. The subjective nature of the tort, the separate acts of
fraud, or the individual circumstances that may exist in order to impose
liability- such as reliance and damage -all combine to cast doubt on
the propriety of the class device. While it cannot be denied that each in-
dividual has a right of action against the wrongdoer, the individual cir-
cumstances and defenses that may arise, the individual privilege that each
person has to prosecute his claim or not and the various remedies that he
may assert such as rescission, restitution, or damages all militate toward
the frustration of the class suit device.
Even in those cases where the relief sought by all is identical, such as
rescission, the courts hold the class suit is not the proper procedural
remedy. In Acton v. Johnson"' the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and
all others, sought rescission of certain contracts under which the defend-
ants had sold certain lots in a newly formed subdivision to the plaintiff
and one hundred and ninety-eight others. These contracts, it was al-
leged, had been entered into relying upon certain fraudulent statements
made to each obligor. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition on the
ground that the representative suit could not be binding on the others,
and hence did not come within the code provision."'
'0E.g., Akely v. Kinnicut, 238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682 (1924) (misleading pros-
pectus).
1240 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1951).
'In other cases only that part of the petition that relates to the suit on behalf of
others is dismissed and the plaintiff is permitted to amend. Bickford's v. Federal
Reserve Bank of N.Y., 5 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
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ACTIONS FOR REFUNDS
Several cases have arisen in which many persons have made payments
which were thought to be obligatory at the time, but were later found
to be unenforceable, entitling these persons to a refund." 3 Although the
person or firm holding the payments is not entitled thereto, and although
each person making the payment has a lawful right to the refund, the
recovery thereof cannot be had by means of the class suit. In Thorn v.
Hormel & Co." 4 it was held that plaintiffs could not recover money paid
to defendant packing house as a result of the defendant's shifting to the
producer of hogs, the processing tax required under the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act. After the Act was held invalid, the defendant withheld
the tax and the plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, sought to recover the tax so retained. On appeal from an order
sustaining a demurrer the court refused to allow a class action because
there were separate transactions between each plaintiff and defendant for
which each had an adequate remedy at law." 5 The net effect of the de-
cision is that the defendant either must be subjected to numerous suits in
order for each of the producers to collect their money, or the defendant
may be unjustly enriched in retaining the processing tax collected.
CASES INVOLVING DEPOSITORS
If numerous general creditors of a banking association seek to recover
deposits to which they are entitled as a result of wrongful acts on the
part of the debtor, they are required to do so by means other than the
class suit." 6 In Lile v. Kefauver"T three persons, for themselves and all
other depositors of a state bank, filed a bill in equity against the directors
of the bank alleging that the directors contrary to law, had declared and
paid a dividend on the capital stock at a time when the bank was insol-
vent. There were more than 1500 depositors and creditors whose aggre-
gate deposits amounted to more than $400,000. The court determined
'Thorn v. Hormel & Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516 (1940); Peoples Store
of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942); State ex rel. Ger-
spacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32, 104 N.E.2d 1 (1952).
'206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516 (1940); 24 MrNN. L. REv. 703 (1940).
' Note here the court speaks of separate and distinct transactions; yet the rights of
the parties involve a common question of law which should satisfy the code pro-
vision. Accord, Smith v. Sparks Milling Co., 219 Ind. 576, 39 N.E.2d 125 (1942).
'
m Lile v. Kefauver, 244 Ky. 486, 51 S.W.2d 473 (1932); Bickford's v. Federal Re-
serve Bank, 5 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); Michelsen v. Penney, 10 F. Supp.
537 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp., 280 Ill. App.
151 (1935).
- 244 Ky. 486, 51 S.W.2d 473 (1932).
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that mere numbers will not authorize joinder nor permit some of the
group to sue for others. Before some could sue for all, there must be a
tangible something such as a trust fund, an insolvent estate, or liens on
the same property in which many persons have the necessary or common
interest. Separate and distinct claims against the same person, the court
indicated, have never been sufficient 8
The courts in these cases look upon the claims of the several deposi-
tors as separate and distinct contracts and refuse to become enveloped in
a doctrine which would permit all creditors of a debtor to bring suit in
one action merely because the debtor is common to all. No court or sys-
tem of procedure would permit all claims by all parties to be brought in
one action merely to avoid a multiplicity of actions, but where the claims
of the several parties arise from a common source, or from a series of
contracts which tie the separate and distinct claims together, there seems
to be some ground for a relaxation of the rule denying the right to bring
an action either by way of joinder of parties or the class device.
AcTiONS BY EMPLOYEES
A few cases have arisen in the state courts under the Fair Labor
Standards Act"19 in which employees seek to recover compensation for
overtime work. Where the state courts have been presented with the
problem, they have followed the line of decisions in other class suit cases
and have refused to permit one or a few employees to sue and recover
for all.'1 2  In Archer v. Musick' l2 the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and
as assignee of thirty-nine other employees, sought to recover overtime pay
and attorney fees claimed to be due on account of service performed in
excess of forty hours per week. Denying the right of the plaintiff to sue
for all even though he held assignments from the other employees, the
court stated:
We do not think that this is a class action .... An action may not be
maintained as a class action by a plaintiff in behalf of himself and others
unless he has the power as a member of the class to satisfy a judgment in
behalf of all members of the class. No one would contend here that
plaintiff could satisfy judgments obtained on the 39 causes of action on
any class action theory.
And in Niehaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp.'2 2 the Missouri
court said:
' But compare the injunction cases discussed above.
'"52 Star. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1952).
'Archer v. Musick, 147 Nebr. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946), rev'd, 25 N.W.2d
908 (1947); Niehaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164
S.W.2d 180 (1942) (obiter); Lonsford v. Burton, 267 P.2d 208 (Ore. 1954).
' 147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946); rev'd, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
'237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180- (1942).
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The case at bar incidentally does not purport to be a class suit and we
may therefore pass that question by, save only to say that the rule which
permits a few persons to sue for themselves and others similarly situated
is one of equitable cognizance and in this state is not to be extended in its
application to cases wholly lacking in equitable features and triable only
as actions at law.'
It is interesting to compare these decisions with Masetta v. National
Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co.1 2 4 where plaintiff, as representative of
many employees, sought under terms of a collective bargaining agreement
to reinstate the employees to their rightful jobs and to recover wages due
to each of the employees. The court permitted the action to be brought
as a class suit and distinguished this case from other suits on the ground
that the rights of the employees grew out of the same agreement and the
contract was entered into for the benefit of the plaintiff and other em-
ployees. Though each of the members of the union was entitled to dif-
ferent amounts of relief, the court said:
It does not seem that the fact that in the instant case, a court of equity
may be required to adjudicate the separate and individual claims of a num-
ber of members of a union and that the claims with respect to compensa-
tion may differ in amount should be reason to prevent maintenance of a
class suit under the code where all of the rights sought to be enforced arise
from a common source, to wit the same contract.
Where the interests of the members of the union arise from a common
source, the collective bargaining contract, the court did not hesitate to
grant relief to the employees.' 2 5 Problems may arise in giving each em-
ployee his compensation. But where the interests of the employees arise
from the statute giving the claims for relief, although there are common
questions of law or fact, no class suit is permitted.
GAMING CASES
The same principle of precluding the class device has been applied
to a number of cases involving gaming or betting where many hundreds
of persons are induced to pay money to participate in a contest or other
betting transaction. 6
"The court seems to overlook the fact that the code provides for an amalgamation
of law and equity and that the code provision should apply to both legal and equita-
ble claims.
-' 107 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio App. 1952). On the appeal the court of appeals was re-
versed, 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15 (1953).
'But cf. Ass'n of Westinghouse Sal. Emps. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 75 Sup.
Ct. 488 (1955).
'Stevens v. Cincinnati Times Star Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 (1905);
Ballin v. Los Angeles County Fair, 43 Cal. App.2d 884, 111 P.2d 753 (1941).
Contra, Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
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A novel scheme to sell newspapers was promoted by the Cincinnati
Times Star, In order to encourage subscriptions the paper decided upon
a plan whereby individuals would be induced to pay fifty cents to the
company. Part of the payment was applied to the price of a subscrip-
tion, the remainder was to be awarded to those who made the most nearly
correct predictions of the total vote which would be cast for a state offi-
cial at the next election. After $200,000 had been collected by such
means, buit before prizes were awarded, the plaintiff brought suit on be-
half of himself and all other contestants to recover the money. The court
refused plaintiff the privilege of representing all the contestants. Since
the contest had not as yet been completed the court pointed out that the
other contestants may not have repented their decisions to enter the con-
test and may not have wanted their contracts rescinded; hence there was
no community of interest among the class.' 27
In Ballin v. Los Angeles County Fair,25 the plaintiff, .who had
wagered on horses, sought to recover money allegedly due to him and
all other wagerers because the defendant had erroneously calculated
"breakage" from the winnings. He sought to recover some $200,000 for
all racing enthusiasts although his claim was only for $3.60. Relying on
the fraud and consumer cases discussed above, the court curdy denied the
plaintiff's right to maintain the suit in the representative form.
But in Kimbrough v. Parker129 the Puritan Church, under the auspices
of one of its chancellors, undertook the promotion of a contest to build a
Puritan meeting house, the contest being advertised in several newspapers.
The contest was a fraud, the solution did not require normal intelligence,
and there was apparently no intention of awarding any prizes. Some
$230,000 was collected and the five plaintiffs sought to recover the
money from the holder. Contrary to the Cincinnati Times Star case, the
court decided that this suit was properly maintained as a class suit. Re-
lying on the facts that there was here a common fund collected, that the
inducements were substantially the same for all contestants, and that the
plaintiffs were fairly representative, the court sustained the chancellor.
It would seem that this case cannot be distinguished from the Times Star
case since in both cases there was a fund collected and in both there were
' The court gives a hint as to the basic reason for denying the action in the repre-
sentative form when it says: "In passing we should take note of the fact that there
would have followed as a necessity from. the sustaining of plaintiff's contention, the
ascertainment by the court through its receivers, of the names and addresses of the
400,000 contributors and the distribution to each of his half dollar, it must be ap-
parent that the magnitude and difficulties of the task would be immeasurably
greater than any good which the painful Working out of the remedy would briig
about."
'43 Cal. App.2d 884, 11t P.2d 753 (1941).
m344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
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substantially the same inducements. Yet the Illinois Court in the Kim-
brough case, apparently seeing an opportunity to clean up in one sweep
this multiple litigation, permitted the action to be brought as a class suit.
MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS
Many decisions in this field do not fit neatly into any classification.
In Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn.,180 the California
court determined that four persons could not sue for all who were wrong-
fully denied admission to the Rose Bowl game, since each individual de-
nied admission was not interested in the claim of the others. The ques-
tion as to each individual plaintiff is whether
he "as a person over twenty-one years" presented himself and demanded
admittance to the game, whether he tendered the price of the ticket, and
whether, as to him the refusal of admission was wrongful under section
53 of the Civil Code, entitling him "to recover ... his actual damages, and
one hundred dollars in addition thereto."
Since a decision favorable or adverse to any one of the plaintiffs could
not determine the rights of any of the unnamed parties, the court was
forced to conclude that plaintiffs' complaint can be regarded
as one more than an invitation to such persons as may be interested to
join with them in this action in seeking relief "arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions" but such situation furnishes no ground
for the maintenance of a representative proceeding....
The same result has been reached where the defendant exacted usuri-
ous payments from many persons and one sought to recover such pay-
ments on behalf of all; 3 ' where recovery was sought for overcharges of
license plates;132 where separate libelous statements were made in one
book concerning numerous individuals 33 and where a railroad had over-
charged numerous persons.1
34
CASES PERMITrING CLASS ACTION
In view of the consistent refusal to apply the class suit device to cases
where each person is entitled to individual relief, it is surprising to dis-
cover a limited number of decisions which, using fine distinctions, per-
mit the class action. Where there is a community of interest, although
- 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948), affirming, 190 P.2d 626 (1948); noted in
37 CALIF. L. REv. 525 (1949) and 23 So. CALIF. L. REv. 285 (1950).
:"Thomas v. Kentucky Trust Co., 156 Ky. 260, 160 S.W. 1037 (1913).
'Garfien v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155 (1935).
'Hart v. E. P. Dutton & Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1949).
2Z4 Covert v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 208 S.W.2d 1008 (Tenn.
1948).
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each member of an ascertained group is entitled to relief different- in
amount, some courts have granted relief.18 5 At one time it appeared that
code provisions would be liberally construed to include the cases under
discussion since the codes provided a convenient device for disposing of
multiple party claims insofar as there was a common interest among the
members. In 1901, a series of decisions came forth from the state of
Kentucky which appeared to break with the orthodox decisions. -
Two cases involved taxpayers' suits to recover illegal tax levies im-
posed by the county.18 6  In Whaley v. Commonwealth17 a county had
adopted a tax rate of thirty-four cents for county purposes during the
year 1897 and later in the same year imposed an additional levy of twen-
ty-five cents for road construction. The constitution imposed a limita-
tion of fifty cents in any one year, and when a decision was rendered
adjudging the excess void, plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other
taxpayers of the county instituted an action against the sheriff and his
sureties to recover the tax illegally collected. Relying on equitable prin-
ciples (to prevent a multiplicity of actions) and the class action section
of the code, the court stated that at one time it was thought that the code
provision did not embrace actions by a taxpayer to restrain the collection
of, or to recover illegal taxes imposed because there was no common title
or identity of interests, but that the modern tendency has been to extend
the rule codified in the language of section 25 so as to include the class
of cases to which this belongs.'8 7
In McCann v. City of Louisville'38 the city of Louisville brought suit
to prohibit two justices of the peace from proceeding to try a large num-
ber of actions. Prior to this action, certain individuals filed an action in
equity for themselves and others alleging that they had paid certain sums
of money to contractors upon apportionment warrants for the cost of con-
struction of cisterns, wells, fire hydrants, etc. The petition further al-
leged that such payments were made under a mistake of law since the city
had no authority to order the construction of the improvements at the
expense of the abutting, property owners or to issue apportionment war-
rants against them, and plaintiffs sought to recover from the city ,the
'Wiggins v. Scott, 112 Ky. 252, 65 S.W, 596 (1901); Masetta v. Nat. Bronze &
Alum. Foundry Co., 107 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio App. 1952), rev'd, 159 Ohio St. 306,
112 N..2d 15 (1953); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 I1. App. 483, 101 NE.2d 617
(1951); Locke v. City of Detroit, 335 Mich. 29, 55 N.W.2d 161 (1952); O'Jay
Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 195 S.E. 564 (1938); Whaley v. Comm., 110-
Ky. 154, 61 S.W. 35 (1901).
'Whaley v, Comm., 110 Ky. i54, 61 S.W. 35 (1901); Wiggins.v. Scott, 112 Ky.
252, 65 S.W. 596 (1901). .
110 K y. 154, 61 S.W. 35 (1901).
s23 Ky. L Rep. 558, 63 S.W. 446 (1901).
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money so paid by them: After this representative suit was filed some
1250 suits were filed in the justices' courts to recover from the city the
various sums, whereupon the city sought this prohibition. Noting that
the city would be burdened with the cost of litigation far beyond the
amount of money really involved, the court relied on the code provision,
stating that the question of the right of the property owners who paid
the warrants to recover their money involved a common interest. "The
question involved," said the court, "Was the liability of the city to re-
fund this money." The taxpayers of the city were interested in a speedy
settlement at as little cost as possible and the code seemed intended to
cover such a case as this. Since the code provision is designed to avoid
a multiplicity of suits and settle the rights of all parties having a common
interest, the court granted the writ and denied the jurisdiction of the
justices.
These decisions may be explained on the ground that there was no
practical difficulty in determining the other members of the class and in
apportioning the relief to which each was entitled and on the additional
ground that to allow a situation where innumerable claims may be made
would be a burden on the taxpayers, depleting funds of a municipal cor-
poration. But, insofar as the cases present a determination of separate
rights and separate relief, involving a common question, they cannot be
distinguished from the cases denying the propriety of the class device.
Several decisions recognizing the convenience of the class device have
permitted employees to bring action for themselves and all others similar-
ly interested where their separate rights are derived from a common
statute, contract or arbitration agreement.139 In Gorley v. City of Louis-
ille,140 ten policemen sued for themselves and other members of the
police force (some 200 in number) to recover compensation allegedly
due as a result of a void order of the board of public safety which relieved
policemen of their duties four days in each month. Demurring to the
petition, the defendants contended that the case did not come within the
provisions of the code. But the court, relying on the McCann decision,
permitted the plaintiffs to maintain the action in the class form.
14 1
When confronted with the Gorley decision in the later case of Union
'Duke v. Boyd County, 225 Ky. 112, 7 S.W.2d 839 (1928); Barnett v. Barnett,
64 S.W. 844 (Ky. 1901); Locke v. City of Detroit, 335 Mich. 29, 55 N.W.2d 161
(1952).
1464 S.W. 844 (Ky. 1901).
1 1 Apart from the fact that this involved an association of a particular group- po-
licemen- there is no reason to believe that the court was not intending to expand
the doctrine of the code to permit actions to be brought by numerous persons where
their rights depended upon a common source -here, the void order -although
each was entitled to separate relief. Also there is no indication that this is not a
law action.
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Heat Light and Power Co. v. Mulligan142 the court of appeals distin-
guished the Gorley case on the ground that the revenue of the city was
involved, and public interest required that the suits be settled in as speedy
a manner as possible and without a waste of public funds which would
be incurred if each plaintiff were required to sue separately. A number
of years later in Duke v. Boyd County 43 where policemen were entitled
to statutory fees upon conviction of a criminal who had been arrested by
the respective officers, the court, relying upon the Gorley decision per-
mitted one policeman to sue for all who were entitled to recover the statu-
tory fees since their respective rights hinged upon the constitutionality
of the statute.
14 4
EFFECr AND RATIONALE OF DECISIONS
The net effect of the decisions taking a restrictive view of the code
provision is that each member of a group, although their rights and in-
terests are derived from one common source and involve similar questions
of law or fact, must sue alone in order to protect his interest or must join
with others and be present before the court. In such a situation, there
would be innumerable actions filed which would unnecessarily burden the
courts. If each member of the group desired to assert his claim the cost
of so doing would be out of proportion to the return which he could
hope to receive. In such decisions as the public utility consumer cases,
each one is required to prosecute his own claim for it would hardly be
possible for all the individuals affected to join in one action.
The decisions indicate that there is no uniform reason why, in a con-
crete factual situation, the courts deny relief in these cases. While some
decisions have stated that a unity of interest is essential to the main-
tenance of the class suit, and others that a fund or property is essential to
the maintenance, these conditions have been absent in many cases where
the class suit was permitted. The fact is that class actions have been al-
lowed when the rights of the numerous parties are wholly separate and
distinct and each could sue alone if he so desired. The effect of the code
provision has been to allow class suits only in those cases in which the
members of the group are united by a common bond of property or iden-
tity of the relief sought. The decisions which deny the propriety of the
class device are not based on the fact that the parties are not united in
interest, or that there is no common or general interest among the mem-
bers of the class (for where the rights of the parties arise from a common
12177 Ky. 662, 197 S.W. 1081 (1917).
1-255 Ky. 112, 7 S.W.2d 839 (1928).
..' Here there seems to be no practical barriers involved since the policmen were all
ascertained and amounts could easily be determined.
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source, there is at least a community of interest in questions of law or
fact) but rather on the following grounds:
1) The class device under the codes is based upon the decisions de-
cided under prior equitable principles. The historical background plays
an important part in determining the extent of the class device as a con-
venient method of omitting certain persons from the record.
2) A restricted interpretation of the term "community of interest"
requires that the decisions be decided in a restrained manner. Since each
individual seeking to be compensated for his claim is not "interested" in
the question whether another individual is to be compensated for his
claim, there is no community of interest in the question involved and
no class suit.
3) The class device as construed under the code provision is inti-
mately tied to permissive joinder of parties. A restrictive interpretation
of permissive joinder of parties, permitting joinder only where the in-
dividuals have an interest in the subject matter and in the relief demanded
has an influence upon a restricted interpretation of permitting the sepa-
rate rights- separate relief class suit. Even though the claims of the
parties arise from the same source, many decisions do not permit permis-
sive joinder and this seems to influence the courts to refuse to permit one
to sue for all.
4) The courts have not seen fit to divorce the principle of res
judicata from the class suit device. The courts reason that where one
individual purports to represent a class he does not have it in his power,
in the event that a judgment be adverse to the representative, to bind
the other members of the class, since in these cases that have been dis-
cussed the absent members have not really been represented in court.
There is no difficulty in applying the principle of res judicata to cases
where there is true representation as in the voluntary organizations and
joint interests cases. In these decisions, since each member of the class
stands in the same position as the other members, his interest is being
enforced and protected or defended when a true representative sues or
defends. But in situations where each person has a distinct and separate
claim for relief, it is difficult to say that his claim would be barred by an
action brought by another who has a similar claim arising from the same
fact pattern. Not being before the court and not having appointed the
plaintiff as his representative to prosecute his claim, the absent party's
interest has been jealously guarded by the courts and they have refused
to permit one to sue for another when the action could not bar the absent
persons. This, of course, is as it should be.
5) To permit the class device in the cases discussed would require
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a determination of such a diversity of circumstances that the class device
would not be feasible. In order to recover for example in the cases in-
volving similar frauds, the conditions precedent to recovery and the de-
fenses would be different as to each member of the class. Since one
member of the class does not and cannot stand in the same position as
all other members of the class, the courts must of necessity state that
there is no common interest among the several members and must there-
fore deny the class suit.
6) Since the practical effects of permitting the class device would
be highly burdensome the courts have seen fit to deny these actions in
the representative form. If the class device were to be used insofar as
there are common questions of law or fact, each person entitled to relief
would have to step forward and present the peculiar facts which entitle
him to compensation. New testimony would have to be taken as to each
member of the class and a determination would have to be made as to
each person. This would involve the court in such administrative detail
that it is far easier to deny the form of the suit altogether.
There is, however, no legal objection to the maintenance of the sepa-
rate rights-separate relief class suit. The class action was designed to be
a remedy of convenience to avoid a multiplicity of litigation, but the in-
terpretations of the state courts do not adhere to this doctrine. Insofar
as the separate rights of individual persons arise from a common source
and are based upon a common transaction or occurrence (or series there-
of) there is a "community of interest," and a liberal interpretation of the
code would seem to authorize a class suit. Although it has been said that
"separate wrongs to separate persons ... do not alone create a common
or general interest in those who are wronged"'1 45 yet where separate rights
arise from a common source (either one act or a series of similar acts) it
cannot be denied that the various members of the class have a community
of interest in the common issue. The situation may be thought of in
terms of a simile: Where the rights of individual persons, like spokes of
a wheel emanate from the hub (the transaction or occurrence) the class
device may be legally allowed; but where the separate and distinct rights
of the parties, arise from various wheels (various separate transactions)
then the class device may not even be legally allowed. Note for example
the case of Thomas v. Kentucky Trust & Security Co.' 4 6 Plaintiff sought
to recover usury paid to the defendants by many persons. The court de-
nied the class suit. Each loan and each payment of usury involved a
separate and independent contract (the spokes did not arise from the
'Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d
374 (1939).
1- 156 Ky. 260, 160 S.W. 1037 (1913).
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same hub) and since there were separate contracts, separate loans, sepa-
rate wrongs to many persons, there were no common questions involved.
CONCLUSION
The state courts, therefore, have not utilized the convenient class de-
vice to the fullest extent to dispose of multi-party litigation. Although
there may often be satisfactory reasons for this self-denial, there is mani-
festly a need for a remedy which can satisfactorily dispose of a mass of
complex modern problems. In many instances that remedy can and
should be the class suit.
